Objectives. To assess the readiness to vaccinate critical infrastructure personnel (CIP) involved in managing public works, emergency services, transportation, or any other system or asset that would have an immediate debilitating impact on the community if not maintained.
T he emergence of an influenza pandemic remains a threat to the United States and the world. 1, 2 In the event of a pandemic, the US government plans to work with partners to develop and distribute enough safe and effective pandemic influenza vaccine for any person in the United States who wants to be vaccinated. 3, 4 However, during the initial stages of the response to a new pandemic, vaccine supplies may be insufficient to meet demand. If the pandemic is severe and its epidemiology suggests that critical infrastructure or societal functions may be compromised, vaccination of those who manage or maintain this infrastructure (critical infrastructure personnel [CIP] ) may be prioritized until vaccine supply expands. [4] [5] [6] [7] Critical infrastructure includes any system or asset that, if not maintained, would have an immediate debilitating impact on society. 8 In 2008, the US Department of Health and Human Services and the Department of Homeland Security issued guidance to planners (hereinafter HHS/DHS guidance) on allocating and targeting pandemic influenza vaccine. The guidance specified how to prioritize vaccine administration to targeted groups (including CIP) depending on pandemic severity. 3 During the 2009 influenza A (H1N1) pandemic, although health care and emergency medical services personnel were part of the initial groups recommended for initial doses of vaccine, vaccine was not prioritized for other CIP groups (e.g., utilities workers) because the functioning of critical infrastructure was not at risk given the moderate severity of the pandemic. 9 Thus, readiness to identify and vaccinate most CIP was not tested. In the 2015 Annual Report, 16 (26.2%) of 61 responding immunization programs (3 did not respond) reported having identified all CIP currently working in their program's jurisdiction; 15 (24.6%) reported having identified more than half, but not all; 7 (11.5%) reported having identified less than half; and 14 (23.0%) had not identified any CIP (Table 1) . When asked if their immunization program had estimated the number of vaccinators needed to vaccinate CIP, 25 (41.0%) reported that they had done this estimation; 16 (26.2%) reported that they had not; 5 (8.2%) reported that this was a local health responsibility; and 15 (24.6%) reported that they did not know whether such an estimate had been made. Thirty-five (57.4%) immunization programs reported that their plan included submission of CIP vaccination data to the jurisdiction's immunization information system (IIS; vaccine registry); 9 (14.8%) reported that they had no plans to submit CIP vaccination data to the IIS; 15 (24.6%) reported that they did not know if their plan included submitting CIP vaccination data to the IIS; and 2 (3.3%) had no IIS (Table 1) .
DISCUSSION
In 2015, 7 years after the first publication of HHS/DHS guidance on pandemic vaccination of CIP, responses from public health programs indicate that many may not be ready to operationalize pandemic vaccination of CIP, if needed. Only 43.3% of PHEP programs reported having a plan to rapidly identify and vaccinate CIP in the event of a severe pandemic, and 26.2% of immunization programs reported having identified all CIP in their program's jurisdiction. Previous research on CIP vaccination readiness is consistent with our findings and suggests minimal improvement in readiness in this effort. In a 2006 review of 49 state pandemic vaccine prioritization 
PUBLC HEALTH IMPLICATIONS
An effective pandemic vaccination campaign is consistently identified as the most effective tool for reducing the impact of the next influenza pandemic, 5, 11 which may have greater morbidity and mortality than the 2009 influenza A (H1N1) pandemic. 4 In a severe pandemic, to ensure preservation of critical functions of society, vaccination may need to be prioritized for CIP. More effort is needed to ensure and track public health program readiness to vaccinate CIP in the case of an influenza pandemic. Maintaining CIP pandemic influenza vaccination readiness may be challenging for programs dealing with competing public health emergencies, workforce turnover, or reduced funding. 12 More research on barriers to readiness is needed. Establishing connections with CIP occupational health groups and others working with CIP in advance of a pandemic can facilitate rapid vaccination of prioritized CIP groups and specific personnel eligible for prioritized vaccination, as soon as a pandemic vaccine becomes available.
Having a CIP vaccination plan in place may help to maximize the benefits of pandemic vaccination efforts in reducing influenza-related morbidity, mortality, and societal disruption.
